UK Diplomats Cautioned Regarding Armed Intervention to Overthrow Zimbabwe's Leader

Newly disclosed documents show that the UK's diplomatic corps cautioned against British military intervention to remove the then Zimbabwean president, the long-serving leader, in 2004, stating it was not considered a "viable option".

Government Documents Show Considerations on Handling a "Depressingly Healthy" Leader

Internal documents from Tony Blair's government indicate officials weighed up options on how best to handle the "remarkably robust" 80-year-old dictator, who declined to leave office as the country fell into turmoil and financial collapse.

Faced with the ruling party winning a 2005 election, and a year after the UK joined a US-led coalition to oust Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein, Downing Street asked the Foreign Office in July 2004 to produce potential options.

Isolation Strategy Considered Not Working

Diplomats concluded that the UK's policy of isolating Mugabe and forging an international agreement for change was not working, having failed to secure support from influential African states, notably the then South African president, the South African leader.

Courses considered in the documents were:

• "Seek to remove Mugabe by military means";
• "Go for tougher UK measures" such as freezing assets and shuttering the UK embassy; or
• "Re-open dialogue", the approach supported by the then outgoing ambassador to Zimbabwe.

"We know from Afghanistan, Iraq and Yugoslavia that changing a government and/or its bad policies is exceedingly difficult from the outside."

The diplomatic assessment rejected military action as not a "serious option," and warned that "The only candidate for leading such a military operation is the UK. No one else (even the US) would be prepared to do so".

Cautionary Notes of Heavy Casualties and Jurisdictional Barriers

It warned that military involvement would result in significant losses and have "considerable implications" for UK nationals in Zimbabwe.

"Short of a major humanitarian and political disaster – resulting in widespread bloodshed, significant exodus of refugees, and instability in the region – we judge that no African state would support any attempts to remove Mugabe by force."

The document adds: "Nor do we judge that any other international ally (including the US) would sanction or participate in military intervention. And there would be no legal grounds for doing so, without an approving Security Council Resolution, which we would not get."

Long-Term Strategy Advocated

The Prime Minister's advisor, a senior official, advised Blair that Zimbabwe "will be a significant obstacle" to his plan to use the UK's leadership of the G8 to make 2005 "the year of Africa". The adviser stated that as military action had been discounted, "we probably have to accept that we must play the longer game" and re-engage with Mugabe.

Blair appeared to agree, noting: "We must devise a way of exposing the falsehoods and misconduct of Mugabe and Zanu-PF ahead of this election and then subsequently, we could try to re-engage on the basis of a clear understanding."

The then outgoing ambassador, in his final diplomatic dispatch, had recommended critical re-engagement with Mugabe, though he understood the Prime Minister "would likely be appalled given all that Mugabe has said and done".

The Zimbabwean leader was finally deposed in a 2017 coup, aged 93. Earlier assertions that in the early 2000s Blair had tried to pressurise the South African president into joining a military coalition to depose Mugabe were vehemently rejected by the former UK premier.